Self-organizing Public-Private Structures in Economics in Change: An Inquiry into Public Control

Jan Gunnarsson
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Jan Gunnarsson: Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen

No 89-04, Discussion Papers from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics

Abstract: In consequence of difficulties with control through central authorities more attention ought to be directed to the functioning of decentralized control. Based on a study of a Swedish municipal intermediation agency for dwellings, this paper focuses on decentralized control in mixed economies. Since it could be useful to relate inquiries into this field to theories of self-organizing systems, an approach will be suggested which starts with information processing in this type of systems. A working hypothesis will be put forward that missing information and feeling of complexity is of great importance to self-organizing processes and a determining factor of efficiency of control. Drawing on Giddens' definition of "duality of structure" I will argue that people alternate between different configurations of knowledge and action and a description of this process of alternations is decisive of our understanding of system behaviour. As we shall see, duality based on archetypical knowledge is of particular interest in this connection. Moreover, if one intends to control a system, one's feeling of complexity must be on a relative low level, so that one is able to specify the system and thereby make predictions of its behaviour. Normally, this is not the cse, but a governor is confronted with ambiguity and bounded rationality.

Pages: 32 pages
Date: 1989-01
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