Asymptotical Strategy-Proofness of Scoring Methods

Peter Fristrup and Hans Keiding
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Hans Keiding: Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen

No 89-10, Discussion Papers from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics

Abstract: A well-known impossibility theorem in social choice theory states that every non-dictatorial social choice function, assigning a unique alternative from a set of at least three to every profile of individual preferences, can be manipulated. In this paper we examine a particular family of social choice functions, the scoring functions, and show that the failure frequency of such functions, understood as the relative frequency of profiles for which the social choice is undefined or can be manipulated, goes to zero as the number n of individuals becomes large. Moreover, the rate of convergence can be established as n(raised to the -1/2 power).

Keywords: social; choice; theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 14 pages
Date: 1989-03
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Published as: "A Note on Asymptotical Strategy-Proofness", in: Economics Letters 31(4), December 1989, pp. 307-312. See also: "Erratum [A Note on Asymptotical Strategy-Proofness]", in: Economics Letters 32(1), January 1990, pp. 105

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kud:kuiedp:8910

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