On the Nucleolus of General Cooperative Games

Flemming Christensen
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Flemming Christensen: Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen

No 91-01, Discussion Papers from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics

Abstract: For cooperative games side payments the prenucleolus has been characterized by a reduced game property. By contrast, for games without side payments several proposals have been made as how to define the nucleolus, i.e. what choice of excess functions is appropriate. In this paper we modify the reduced game property for games without side payments and demonstrate that a unique version of the nucleolus satisfy this modified reduced game property.

Pages: 17 pages
Date: 1991-01
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kud:kuiedp:9101

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