A Kernel Variant for General Cooperative Games: Characterization Results

Flemming Christensen
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Flemming Christensen: Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen

No 91-07, Discussion Papers from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics

Abstract: For cooperative games with sidepayments the prekernel has been characterized by a reduced game property and its converse. In this paper we investigate the possibilities for a generalization of this result to the environment of cooperative games without sidepayments. This leads to the introduction of a variant of the kernel which does not generalize the prekernel of sidepayment games but which can be characterized by a set of axioms closely related to those characterizing the prekernel of sidepayment games. Moreover, it is shown that this variant can be seen as the solution to a certain dynamic system.

Pages: 18 pages
Date: 1991-04
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kud:kuiedp:9107

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