Renegotiation in Repeated Cournot-Duopoly

Edward Driffill () and Christian Schultz ()

No 91-13, Discussion Papers from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics

Abstract: We investigate a repeated Cournot duopoly with strictly convex cost functions. In an example the set of Weakly Renegotiation Proof Equilibrium payoffs shrinks towards the joint profit maximizing payoff point as marginal costs are made to rise more rapidly.

Keywords: Cournot duopoly; renegotiation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 1991-09
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in: Economics Letters, 1995, 47(2) pp 143-148

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Journal Article: Renegotiation in a repeated Cournot duopoly (1995)
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