Common Agency and Decision Making: A Note on Existence

Torben Tranaes ()

No 91-23, Discussion Papers from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics

Abstract: The note intends to highlight the relevance of the common-agency model to a characteristic class of problems containing for instance decision making in hierarchies, lobbyism and local authorities competing on being the host for an important activity. Existence for the whole class of common-agency models requires the strategy sets to be convex. Whereas, for the subclass considered here, we can prove existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibria.

Keywords: common agency; decision making in hierarchies, lobbyism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 6 pages
Date: 1991-12
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kud:kuiedp:9123

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