The One-Deviation Principle for Sequential Rationality

: Ebbe : Hendon, Hans Jørgen Jacobsen and Birgitte Sloth ()
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: Ebbe : Hendon: Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen
Hans Jørgen Jacobsen: Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen

No 92-05, Discussion Papers from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics

Abstract: In this paper we present a decentralization result which is useful for practical and theoretical work with the concept of sequential equilibrium and related concepts of perfect Bayesian equilibrium. A weak consistency condition which is sufficient to obtain an analogy to the well-known One-Deviation Principle for subgame perfect equilibrium is given.

Pages: 12 pages
Date: 1992-07
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