Some Determinants of Insider Power in the Labor Market

Henrik Lando

No 93-06, Discussion Papers from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics

Abstract: An insider-outsider model is constructed in a non-cooperative bargaining framework. In the model there is one employer and a continuum of workers. A majority of the workers can, by threatening to withdraw from bargaining if the employer enters into bargaining with the remaining workers, exclude those from working. The paper analyzes how the incentive to exclude and the size of the excluding coalition are determined by the shape of the employer's revenue function, by the choice of bargaining solution, and by whether or not there is a rule prohibiting permanent replacement of striking workers.

Pages: 26 pages
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kud:kuiedp:9306

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Papers from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics Oester Farimagsgade 5, Building 26, DK-1353 Copenhagen K., Denmark. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Hoffmann ().