The Politics of Persuasion when Voters are Rational

Christian Schultz ()

No 93-15, Discussion Papers from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics

Abstract: A democratic society is considered where the voters, but not the politicians, are uncertain about how the economy works. The parties therefore have a strategic motive to misinform the voters. Will the voters learn how the economy works and will the policy decisions be efficient? It turns out that the degree of polarization of the political parties is crucial. If the parties are very polarized, voters will not trust the parties and the policy will not reflect how the economy actually works.

Keywords: economic models of political processes; social choice studies; voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pages
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Published in: Journal of Economics, 1995, 97(3) pp 357-368

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kud:kuiedp:9315

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