Polarization and Inefficient Policies

Christian Schultz ()

No 93-16, Discussion Papers from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics

Abstract: Two parties have different goals. Voters, but not parties, are uncertain about the functioning of the economy, in this case the costs of producing a public good. The parties each propose a policy, an election is held and the policy of the winning party is implemented. Voters and parties care about the level of the public good and costs. Two kinds of sequential equilibria exist; revealing, where voters learn the true costs and the implemented policy adjusts to costs, and non-revealing. If parties' preferences are polarized, only non-revealing equilibria fulfill a refinement criterion like the intuitive criterion. If they are alike, only revealing equilibria fulfill this criterion. Thus, less political polarization improves information revelation.

Keywords: economic models of political processes; social choice studies; voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Published in: Review of Economic Studies, 1996, 63(2) pp 331-344

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kud:kuiedp:9316

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