Fictitious Play in Extensive Form Games

Ebbe Hendon, Hans Jørgen Jacobsen and Birgitte Sloth ()
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Ebbe Hendon: Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen
Hans Jørgen Jacobsen: Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen

No 94-06, Discussion Papers from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics

Abstract: This article analyzes the fictitious play process originally proposed for strategic form games by Brown (1951) and Robinson (1951). We interpret the process as a model of preplay thinking performed by players before acting in a one-shot game. This model is one of bounded rationality. We discuss how fictitious play should then be defined for extensive form games and conclude that this is somewhat problematic. We therefore study two alternative definitions. For either of these, under a weak condition of initial uncertainty, a convergence point of a fictitious play sequence is a sequential equilibrium. For generic games of perfect information initial uncertainty also implies convergence of fictitious play.

JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36 pages
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior, 1996, 15(2) pp 177-202

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kud:kuiedp:9406

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