Stochastic Learning and the Intuitive Criterion in Simple Signaling Games

Hans Jørgen Jacobsen and Birgitte Sloth ()
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Hans Jørgen Jacobsen: Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen

No 96-15, Discussion Papers from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics

Abstract: A stochastic learning process for signaling games with two types, two signals, and two responses gives rise to equilibrium selection which is in remarkable accordance with the selection obtained by the intuitive criterion.

Pages: 27 pages
Date: 1996-11
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kud:kuiedp:9615

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