Debt as a Regulatory Constraint

Lars Jebjerg ()

No 99-02, Discussion Papers from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper is about using specific investments and secured debt to shield a firm from exploitation by a regulatory authority. It is shown that specific investments and secured debt constrain the regulatory authority in its choice of regime, by providing a credible threat of bankruptcy.

Keywords: regulation; financial structure; hold-up problems (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D21 G38 L50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 16 pages
Date: 1999-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ent, nep-mic and nep-reg
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kud:kuiedp:9902

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