Stable Voting Procedures for Committees in Economic Environments

Hans Keiding and Bezalel Peleg
Additional contact information
Hans Keiding: Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen

No 99-20, Discussion Papers from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics

Abstract: A strong representation of a committee, formalized as a simple game, on a convex and closed set of alternatives is a game form with the members of the committee as players such that (i) the winning coalitions of the simple game are exactly those coalitions, which can get any given alternative independent of the strategies of the complement, and (ii) for any profile of continuous and convex preferences, the resulting game has a strong Nash equilibrium. In the paper, it is investigated whether committees have representations on convex and compact subsets of Rm. This is shown to be the case if there are vetoers; for committees with no vetoers the existence of strong representations depends on the structure of the alternative set as well as on that of the committee (its Nakamura-number). Thus, if A is strictly convex, compact, and has smooth boundary, then no committee can have a strong representation on A. On the other hand, if A has non-smooth boundary, representations may exist depending on the Nakamura-number (if it is at least 7).

Keywords: committees; simple games; representation; effectivity functions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26 pages
Date: 1999-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.econ.ku.dk/english/research/publications/wp/1999/9920.pdf/ (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Stable voting procedures for committees in economic environments (2001)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kud:kuiedp:9920

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Papers from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics Oester Farimagsgade 5, Building 26, DK-1353 Copenhagen K., Denmark. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Hoffmann ().