Representation of Effectivity Functions in Coalition Proof Nash Equilibrium: A Complete Characterization

Hans Keiding and Bezalel Peleg
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Hans Keiding: Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen

No 99-21, Discussion Papers from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics

Abstract: The concept of coalition proof Nash equilibrium was introduced by Bernheim, Peleg, and Whinston [1987]. In the present paper, we consider the representation problem for coalition proof Nash equilibrium: For a given effectivity function, describing the power structure or the system of rights of coalitions in society, it is investigated whether there is a game form which gives rise to this effectivity function and which is such that for any preference assignment, there is a coalition proof Nash equilibrium. It is shown that the effectivity functions which can be represented in coalition proof Nash equilibrium are exactly those which satisfy the well-known properties of maximality and superadditivity. As a corollary of the result, we obtain necessary conditions for implementation of a social choice correspondence in coalition proof Nash equilibrium which can be formulated in terms of the associated effectivity function.

Keywords: effectivity functions; representation; coalition proof; Nash equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 1999-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Representation of effectivity functions in coalition proof Nash equilibrium: A complete characterization (2002)
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