Inequality aversion, social discount, and time discount rates

Takanori Ida and Kazuhito Ogawa ()

Discussion papers from Graduate School of Economics Project Center, Kyoto University

Abstract: Purpose - We conduct a hypothetical dictator game with social distance and time delays using conjoint analysis. Design / methodology / approach - Responses from 1,347 Japanese adults are collected through an online survey, and their responses are analyzed using a random parameter logit model. Findings - Social preference for the present income of a stranger equals social preference for the income of an acquaintance 140 days later, of a close friend 224 days later, and of a family member 255 days later. Originality / value- We simultaneously estimate social preference parameters including the inequality aversion rate, the social discount rate, and the time discount rate Headings - Inequality aversion, social discount, and time discount Keywords - dictator game, inequality aversion, social discounting, time discounting Paper type – Research paper

Pages: 29 pages
Date: 2010-12
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Inequality aversion, social discount, and time discount rates (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kue:dpaper:e-10-013

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