The Safer, the Riskier:A Model of Bank Leverage and Financial Instability
Ryo Kato () and
Takayuki Tsuruga ()
Discussion papers from Graduate School of Economics Project Center, Kyoto University
This note provides an example of a case where nancial instability can be ampli ed by stable fundamentals rather than risky fundamentals, using a variation of Diamond and Rajan (2009). Paper type – Research paper
Keywords: Bank runs; Great moderation; Financial crisis; Maturity mismatch (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E3 G01 G21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 11 pages
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kue:dpaper:e-10-014
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