The Safer, the Riskier:A Model of Bank Leverage and Financial Instability

Ryo Kato and Takayuki Tsuruga

Discussion papers from Graduate School of Economics Project Center, Kyoto University

Abstract: This note provides an example of a case where nancial instability can be ampli ed by stable fundamentals rather than risky fundamentals, using a variation of Diamond and Rajan (2009). Paper type – Research paper

Keywords: Bank runs; Great moderation; Financial crisis; Maturity mismatch (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E3 G01 G21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 11 pages
Date: 2011-02
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.econ.kyoto-u.ac.jp/projectcenter/Paper/e-10-014.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kue:dpaper:e-10-014

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion papers from Graduate School of Economics Project Center, Kyoto University Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Graduate School of Economics Project Center ().