Comparative Statics for Oligopoly: A Generalized Result

Naoto Jinji

Discussion papers from Graduate School of Economics Project Center, Kyoto University

Abstract: We perform comparative statics for a general model of asymmetric oligopoly and derive a concise formula for the response of one firm to a marginal change in its rival’s strategic variable, taking into account the responses of all other firms. We obtain the conditions under which the sign of this response coincides with that of the mixed second-order partial derivative of the firm’s payoff function. We then propose a distinction between gross and net strategic relationships (i.e., strategic substitute and complement).

Keywords: comparative statics; asymmetry; stability conditions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 D43 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 15 pages
Date: 2013-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-com and nep-ind
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.econ.kyoto-u.ac.jp/projectcenter/Paper/e-12-011.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Comparative statics for oligopoly: A generalized result (2014)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kue:dpaper:e-12-011

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion papers from Graduate School of Economics Project Center, Kyoto University Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Graduate School of Economics Project Center ().