Menu Mechanisms

Andrew Mackenzie and Yu Zhou

Discussion papers from Graduate School of Economics , Kyoto University

Abstract: We investigate menu mechanisms: dynamic mechanisms where at each history, an agent selects from a menu of his possible assignments. In comparison to direct mechanisms, menu mechanisms offer better privacy to participants; we formalize this with a novel notion of mechanism informativeness. We consider both ex-post implementation and full implementation, for both subgame perfection and a strengthening of dominance that covers off-path histories, and provide conditions under which menu mechanisms provide these implementations of rules. Our results cover a variety of environments, including elections, marriage, college admissions, auctions, labor markets, matching with contracts, and object allocation.

Keywords: menu mechanism; privacy; strategy-proofness; robust implementation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D47 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 38
Date: 2020-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-des and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Journal Article: Menu mechanisms (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kue:epaper:e-19-012

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