TRACT HOUSING, THE CORE, AND PENDULUM AUCTIONS

Andrew Mackenzie and Yu Zhou

Discussion papers from Graduate School of Economics , Kyoto University

Abstract: We consider a model of tract housing where buyers and sellers have (i) wealth constraints, and (ii) unit demand over identical indivisible objects represented by a valuation. First, we characterize the strong core. Second, we characterize the bilat- eral weak core, or the weak core allocations with no side-payments. Finally, when buyer wealth constraints and valuations are private information and when trans- fers are discrete, we introduce two families of pendulum auctions, both of which consist of obviously strategy-proof selections of the bilateral weak core. The buyer- optimal pendulum auctions are preferred by the buyers but are inefficient when side-payments are possible, while the efficient pendulum auctions are efficient

Keywords: tract housing; core; pendulum auction; almost-synchronized equilibrium; private wealth constraints; efficiency; obvious strategy-proofness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D41 D47 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 55
Date: 2022-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kue:epaper:e-22-005

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