The Cultural Transmission of Trust and Trustworthiness
Akira Okada ()
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Akira Okada: Kyoto University
No 1001, KIER Working Papers from Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research
We consider the cultural transmission of trust and trustworthiness in a trust game with spatial matching a la Tabellini. Players are assumed to enjoy psychological benefits from good conducts. The equilibrium probability that an investor trusts a receiver is a monotonically decreasing function of social distance, and the one that the receiver behaves in a trustworthy manner is non-monotonic. Parents with imperfect empathy transmit their own values to their children through education, and the ratio of individuals with good values globally converges to a stationary point with heterogeneity if educational costs are sufficiently small. Trust and trustworthiness are infl uenced by institutions in different ways. A better "intermediate" enforcement crowds out trust and crowds in trustworthiness.
Keywords: crowding effect; cultural transmission; random matching game; social distance; trust; trustworthiness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D02 D64 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-ure
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kyo:wpaper:1001
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