Part I: A Core Framework and an Impossibility Result for Dynamic Social Evaluation under Irreversible Constraints

Etsusaku Shimada ()
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Etsusaku Shimada: Faculty of Policy Studies, Iwate Prefectural University

No 1122, KIER Working Papers from Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research

Abstract: This paper reports preliminary results from an ongoing research program on dynamic social evaluation under irreversible constraints. The scope of the present analysis is intentionally limited. We introduce a core framework in which social outcomes are modeled as infinite histories that include an irreversible state variable, and we establish a baseline impossibility result on the unrestricted domain under minimal regularity and anonymity requirements. The paper deliberately stops short of proposing solutions: in particular, it does not characterize admissible domain restrictions, does not derive representation theorems, and does not resolve the impossibility. The purpose of this paper is to isolate the structural source of incoherence in dynamic social evaluation under irreversible constraints.

Keywords: Social choice; Irreversibility; Domain restriction; Anonymity; Impossibility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 D71 D90 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 5pages
Date: 2026-01
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kyo:wpaper:1122

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