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Interim Efficient Allocations under Uncertainty

Atsushi Kajii and Takashi Ui

No 642, KIER Working Papers from Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research

Abstract: This paper considers an exchange economy under uncertainty with asymmetric information. Uncertainty is represented by multiple priors and posteriors of agents who have either Bewley's incomplete preferences or Gilboa-Schmeidler's maximin expected utility preferences. The main results characterize interim efficient allocations under uncertainty; that is, they provide conditions on the sets of posteriors, thus implicitly on the way how agents update the sets of priors, for non-existence of a trade which makes all agents better off at any realization of private information. For agents with the incomplete preferences, the condition is necessary and sufficient, but for agents with the maximin expected utility preferences, the condition is sufficient only. A couple of necessary conditions for the latter case are provided.

Keywords: multiple priors; interim efficiency; no trade; dynamic consistency; rectangular prior set (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D81 D82 D84 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23pages
Date: 2007-11
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Journal Article: Interim efficient allocations under uncertainty (2009) Downloads
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