EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

A Double-Track Auction for Substitutes and Complements

Ning Sun () and Zaifu Yang ()
Additional contact information
Ning Sun: School of Economics, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics
Zaifu Yang: Faculty of Business Administration, Yokohama National University

No 656, KIER Working Papers from Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research

Abstract: We propose a new t^atonnement process called a double-track auction for efficiently allocating multiple heterogeneous indivisible items in two distinct sets S1 and S2 to many buyers who view items in the same set as substitutes but items across the two sets as complements. The auctioneer initially announces sufficiently low prices for items in one set, say S1, but sufficiently high prices for items in the other set S2. In each round, the buyers respond by reporting their demands at the current prices and the auctioneer adjusts prices upwards for items in S1 but downwards for items in S2 based on buyers' reported demands until the market is clear. Unlike any existing auction, this auction is a blend of a multi-item ascending auction and a multi-item descending auction. We prove that the auction finds an efficient allocation and its market-clearing prices in finitely many rounds. Based on the auction we also establish a dynamic, efficient and strategy-proof mechanism.

Keywords: Market design; dynamic auction; t^atonnement process; gross substitutes and complements; Walrasian equilibrium; incentives. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34pages
Date: 2008-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.kier.kyoto-u.ac.jp/DP/DP656.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kyo:wpaper:656

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in KIER Working Papers from Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Ryo Okui (). This e-mail address is bad, please contact .

 
Page updated 2020-03-30
Handle: RePEc:kyo:wpaper:656