Estimating Noncooperative and Cooperative Models of Bargaining: An Empirical Comparison

Masanori Mitsutsune () and Takanori Adachi
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Masanori Mitsutsune: Tokyo Metropolitan Government

No 799, KIER Working Papers from Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research

Abstract: This paper examines the issue of model selection in studies of strategic situations. In particular, we compare estimation results from Adachi and Watanabe's (2008) noncooperative formulation of government formulation with those from two alternative cooperative formulations. Although the estimates of the ministerial ranking are similar, statistical testing suggests that Adachi and Watanabe's(2008) noncooperative formulation is best fitted to the observed data among the alternative models. This result implies that modeling the time structure in bargaining situations is crucially important at the risk of possibly misspecifying the details of the game.

Keywords: Model selection; Bargaining; Government formation; Structural estimation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C52 C71 C72 C78 H19 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ecm and nep-gth
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Related works:
Journal Article: Estimating noncooperative and cooperative models of bargaining: an empirical comparison (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kyo:wpaper:799

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