Interest in Private Assets and the Voracity Effect
Yohei Tenryu ()
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Yohei Tenryu: Graduate School of Economics, Kyoto University
No 850, KIER Working Papers from Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research
Using a differential game, we analyze a multiple agent economy in which there are common and private capital stocks. Each interest group can access the common capital and its own private capital stocks but not anyone else's private capital stocks. Considering the situation in which each interest group can observe and has interest in the opponents' private capital stocks, we show the following. The capital stocks have a negative effect on the consumption of each agent. The growth rate of the common capital does not depend on the technology level of the common sector; that is there is no voracity effect. Each agent's welfare is always lower than it is in the case that each agent has no interest in the opponents' private capital stocks.
Keywords: differential game; Markov-perfect equilibrium; the voracity effect (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 O10 O40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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