An evolutionary approach to social choice problems with q-quota rules
Akira Okada and
Ryoji Sawa
No 936, KIER Working Papers from Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research
Abstract:
This paper considers a dynamic process of n-person social choice problems under q-majority where a status-quo policy is challenged by an opposing policy drawn randomly in each period. The opposing policy becomes the next status-quo if it receives at least q votes. We characterize stochastically stable policies under a boundedly rational choice rule of voters. Under the best response rule with mutations, a Condorcet winner is stochastically stable for all q-quota rules, and uniquely so if q is greater than the minmax quota. Under the logit choice rule, the Borda winner is stochastically stable under the unanimity rule. Our evolutionary approach provides a dynamic foundation of the mini-max policies in multidimensional choice problems with Euclidean preferences.
Keywords: Stochastic stability; Social choice; Voting; Condorcet winner. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C73 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 58pages
Date: 2016-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-evo, nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kyo:wpaper:936
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