EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

An evolutionary approach to social choice problems with q-quota rules

Akira Okada and Ryoji Sawa

No 936, KIER Working Papers from Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research

Abstract: This paper considers a dynamic process of n-person social choice problems under q-majority where a status-quo policy is challenged by an opposing policy drawn randomly in each period. The opposing policy becomes the next status-quo if it receives at least q votes. We characterize stochastically stable policies under a boundedly rational choice rule of voters. Under the best response rule with mutations, a Condorcet winner is stochastically stable for all q-quota rules, and uniquely so if q is greater than the minmax quota. Under the logit choice rule, the Borda winner is stochastically stable under the unanimity rule. Our evolutionary approach provides a dynamic foundation of the mini-max policies in multidimensional choice problems with Euclidean preferences.

Keywords: Stochastic stability; Social choice; Voting; Condorcet winner. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C73 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 58pages
Date: 2016-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-evo, nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.kier.kyoto-u.ac.jp/DP/DP936.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kyo:wpaper:936

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in KIER Working Papers from Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Makoto Watanabe ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-30
Handle: RePEc:kyo:wpaper:936