Do clubs foster provision success ?
Mohamed Ali Bchir and
Marc Willinger ()
Working Papers from LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier
We report the results of an experiment on the provision of a step-level collective good. We compare subjects’ behavior in a public good game and in a club good game. In the club good game, players who contribute less than the amount required to become a member, do not benefit from the collective good. Compared to the benchmark step-level public good, we find that the introduction of a small membership fee has surprisingly strong effects. It increases significantly the provision success of the collective good.
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-pbe and nep-spo
Date: 2009-12, Revised 2009-12
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http://www.lameta.univ-montp1.fr/Documents/DR2009-19.pdf First version, 2009 (application/pdf)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lam:wpaper:09-19
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