Managerial incentives under competitive pressure: Experimental investigation
Ahmed Ennasri () and
Marc Willinger ()
Working Papers from LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier
We investigate the effects of competition on managerial incentives and effort in a laboratory experiment. Each owner offers compensation to his manager in two different contexts: monopoly and Cournot duopoly. After accepting the compensation, the manager chooses an effort level to increase the probability of reduced costs of his firm. Theory predicts that the entry of a rival firm in a monopolistic industry affects negatively both the incentive compensation and the effort level. Our experimental findings confirm that the entry of a rival firm reduces the incentive compensation but not the manager’s effort level. However, despite the reduction of the incentive compensation, the manager continues to accept the contract offers and exert the same level of effort.
Keywords: Managerial Incentives; Effort; Competition; Moral hazard; Experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-com, nep-cta, nep-exp, nep-hrm and nep-lab
Date: 2011-06, Revised 2011-06
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lam:wpaper:11-12
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