Mixed strategies in an unprofitable game: an experiment
Charles Noussair and
Marc Willinger ()
Working Papers from LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier
We report experimental data from a two-player, two-action unprofitable game with an unique mixed strategy equilibrium. Our design allows subjects to explicitly choose probability distributions over actions. Patterns of play differ greatly from the mixed strategy equilibrium and the maxmin strategy profiles, both when measured as subjects’ choices of probability distributions, and as the resulting actions played. The Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) concept is a good predictor of the subjects' average choices.
Date: 2011-11, Revised 2011-11
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http://www.lameta.univ-montp1.fr/Documents/DR2011-19.pdf First version, 2011 (application/pdf)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lam:wpaper:11-19
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