Mixed strategies in an unprofitable game: an experiment

Charles Noussair and Marc Willinger

Working Papers from LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier

Abstract: We report experimental data from a two-player, two-action unprofitable game with an unique mixed strategy equilibrium. Our design allows subjects to explicitly choose probability distributions over actions. Patterns of play differ greatly from the mixed strategy equilibrium and the maxmin strategy profiles, both when measured as subjects’ choices of probability distributions, and as the resulting actions played. The Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) concept is a good predictor of the subjects' average choices.

Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2011-11, Revised 2011-11
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lam:wpaper:11-19

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