WHY MY PARTICIPATION MATTERS: Rent-seeking with endogenous prize determination
Klarizze Anne Puzon and
Marc Willinger ()
Working Papers from LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier
We analyze an institutionalized rent-seeking game in which groups can endogenously choose the prize at stake, e.g. a common-pool resource. In the first stage, groups determine how much of the resource to protect and equally share. In the second stage, the unprotected fraction is competed for in a rent-seeking game. We consider two institutions varying in the extent by which subjects participate: majority voting (i.e. "unrestrained participation" where all group members participate in the protection stage) and dictatorial rule (i.e. "limited participation" where only one member decides in the protection stage) [...]
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-env, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-pol
Date: 2014-06, Revised 2014-06
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lam:wpaper:14-05
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