Intergroup Solidarity and Local Public Goods Provision: An Experiment

Rustam Romaniuc (), Dimitri Dubois (), Gregory DeAngelo and Bryan McCannon

Working Papers from LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier

Abstract: The effects from voluntarily choosing to accept or reject solidarity with outgroup members oningroup cooperation has not been studied from a behavioral perspective yet. Our contribution to theliterature on intergroup solidarity and ingroup cooperation is twofold. First, building on the publicgoods game, we design a novel experiment that allows us to study intergroup solidarity by allowinghigher endowed groups to voluntarily share the benefits from their group account with less endowedgroups. Second, we show that voluntarily – by voting – refusing solidarity with a less endowed groupresults in a breakdown in cooperation within the group that voted. The mere thought that sharing withoutgroups is costly spills over to the ingroup contribution decisions.

Pages: 29 pages
Date: 2016-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-soc and nep-spo
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lam:wpaper:16-11

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