Intergroup Solidarity and Local Public Goods Provision: An Experiment
Rustam Romaniuc (),
Dimitri Dubois (),
Gregory DeAngelo and
Bryan McCannon ()
Working Papers from LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier
The effects from voluntarily choosing to accept or reject solidarity with outgroup members oningroup cooperation has not been studied from a behavioral perspective yet. Our contribution to theliterature on intergroup solidarity and ingroup cooperation is twofold. First, building on the publicgoods game, we design a novel experiment that allows us to study intergroup solidarity by allowinghigher endowed groups to voluntarily share the benefits from their group account with less endowedgroups. Second, we show that voluntarily – by voting – refusing solidarity with a less endowed groupresults in a breakdown in cooperation within the group that voted. The mere thought that sharing withoutgroups is costly spills over to the ingroup contribution decisions.
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-soc and nep-spo
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lam:wpaper:16-11
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