Market Evolution, Bidding Strategies, and Survival of Art Dealers

Dakshina De Silva, Marina Gertsberg and Rachel Pownall

No 138739557, Working Papers from Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department

Abstract: We show the value of expertise during the evolution of a market characterized by asymmetric information. Using a unique historical data set, we show how market dynamics encourage entrants. Our results provide evidence that better informed dealers pay about 24% more for an artwork of the same quality than less informed dealers. Additionally, our results indicate that informed dealers are more likely to survive in the market. Our evidence supports the conjecture that, in common value auctions, when information asymmetries are present, dealers with better information benefit. These results have important implications for maintaining and sustaining competitive advantage.

Keywords: Auctions; Bidding; Art Dealers; Market Evolution; Common value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C57 D44 D47 Z11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cul
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.lancaster.ac.uk/media/lancaster-univers ... casterWP2016_017.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lan:wpaper:138739557

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Giorgio Motta ().