Dealer Networks in the World of Art
Dakshina De Silva (),
Georgia Kosmopoulou and
Rachel Pownall ()
No 198144199, Working Papers from Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department
We apply network theory to study auction outcomes in the fine art market. Using a unique historical data set, of London-based art auctions that took place between 1741 and 1913, we investigate the drivers of strategic network formation between dealers (buyers) and sellers and the effect of network structure on artwork prices and market exit. The network size and similarities in art specialization between trading partners strongly influence the decision to form links. A larger network and a higher degree of specialization exacerbate informational asymmetries across buyers leading to higher rents through lower prices and facilitate longer market presence.
Keywords: Auctions; Art Dealers; Networks (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D82 L14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-cul, nep-his and nep-net
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lan:wpaper:198144199
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