Tax Evasion, Embezzlement and Public Good Provision
Chowdhury Mohammad S Anwar,
Alexander Matros and
Sonali Sen Gupta
No 232397285, Working Papers from Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department
This paper presents a model that links tax evasion, embezzlement, and the public good provision and suggests how they are interrelated. We characterize the conditions for three types of Nash equilibria: tax evasion, embezzlement, and efficient public good provision.
Keywords: Tax evasion; Embezzlement; Corruption; Audits; Sanctions; Public goods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D73 D83 H40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc, nep-iue, nep-mic, nep-pbe and nep-pub
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lan:wpaper:232397285
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