Improving Abatement Levels and Welfare by Coarse Correlation in an Environmental Game

Trivikram Dokka Venkata Satyanaraya, Herve Moulin, Indrajit Ray () and Sonali Sen Gupta

No 266042710, Working Papers from Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department

Abstract: Coarse correlated equilibria (CCE, Moulin and Vial, 1978) can be used to substantially improve upon the Nash equilibrium solution of the well-analysed abatement game (Barrett, 1994). We show this by computing successively the CCE with the largest total utility, the one with the highest possible abatement levels and finally, the one with maximal abatement level while maintaining at least the level of utility from the Nash outcome.

Keywords: Abatement game; Coarse correlated equilibrium; Efficiency gain (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 Q52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env, nep-gth, nep-ore and nep-upt
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lan:wpaper:266042710

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