Protest voting in the laboratory

Philippos Louis, Orestis Troumpounis (), Nikolas Tsakas and Dimitrios Xefteris

No 288072952, Working Papers from Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department

Abstract: Formal analysis predicts that the likelihood of an electoral accident depends on the preference intensity for a successful protest, but not on the protest's popularity: an increase in protest's popularity is fully offset by a reduction in the individual probability of casting a protest vote. By conducting the first laboratory experiment on protest voting, we find strong evidence in favor of the first prediction and qualified support for the latter. While the offset effect is present, it is not as strong as the theory predicts: protest candidates gain both by fanaticising existing protesters and by expanding the protest's popular base.

Keywords: protest voting; electoral accident; coordination; laboratory experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: Protest voting in the laboratory (2020)
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