The acceptability of lotteries in allocation problems
Elias Bouacida and
No 301646245, Working Papers from Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department
We report the results of two experiments on the social acceptability of random devices in allocation mechanisms. A majority of subjects do not opt for a lottery if they can rationalize an alternative mechanism as non-random. It is, however, possible to design a payoff-equivalent mechanism to the lottery that is more acceptable. Our results shed light on the real-world reliance on obscure criteria in allocation problems where lotteries seem to be simpler and more efficient.
Keywords: lotteries; mechanism design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D01 D78 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-exp
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