Equilibrium Design by Coarse Correlation in Quadratic Games

Trivikram Dokka Venkata Satyanaraya, Herve Moulin, Indrajit Ray () and Sonali Sen Gupta

No 301895429, Working Papers from Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department

Abstract: In a public good provision or a public bad abatement situation, the non-cooperative interplay of the participants typically results in low levels of provision or abatement. In the familiar class of n-person quadratic games, we show that Coarse Correlated equilibria (CCEs) - simple mediated communication devices that do not alter the strategic structure of the game - can significantly outperform the Nash equilibrium in terms of the policy objective above.

Keywords: Quadratic game; Coarse correlated equilibrium; Abatement level; Efficiency gain (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 Q52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-gth and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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