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Efficient Public Good Provision in a Multipolar World

Chowdhury Mohammad S Anwar, Jorge Bruno, Renaud Foucart and Sonali Sen Gupta

No 377534420, Working Papers from Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department

Abstract: We model a public goods game with groups, position uncertainty, and observational learning. Contributions are simultaneous within groups, but groups play sequentially based on their observation of an incomplete sample of past contributions. We show that full cooperation between and within groups is possible with self-interested players on a fixed horizon. Position uncertainty implies the existence of an equilibrium where groups of players conditionally cooperate in the hope of influencing further groups. Conditional cooperation implies that each group member is pivotal, so that efficient simultaneous provision within groups is an equilibrium.

Keywords: Public Goods; Groups; Position Uncertainty; Voluntary Contributions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-pub
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Working Paper: Efficient Public Good Provision in a Multipolar World (2023) Downloads
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