Preference for Control vs. Random Dictatorship

Antonio Estache, Renaud Foucart and Konstantinos Georgalos

No 413554011, Working Papers from Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department

Abstract: In a laboratory experiment, we find that subjects do not exhibit preference for control when the alternative is a random dictatorship, a lottery implementing either their choice or the choice of someone else with equal probability. In contrast, we replicate Owens et al. (2014)’s result that they do so when the alternative is to have the choice of someone else implemented with certainty. This implies that the introduction of random dictatorships in discrete procedures such as those used for the allocation of some public procurement contracts does not necessarily involve a loss of perceived autonomy.

Keywords: control; lotteries; random dictatorship (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D44 D8 H57 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: Preference for Control vs. Random Dictatorship (2024)
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