Going for growth: overeducation in a tax competition game

Geraint Johnes

No 539960, Working Papers from Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department

Abstract: A model of international tax competition is developed in which taxes are raised in order to finance education which in turn raises income. It is shown that, in contrast to results from the tax competition literature, the outcome of a non-cooperative game can be to raise the tax rate, with the result that investment in education exceeds that which is globally socially optimal. This provides an explanation for the tendency for countries to emphasise growth as an objective in spite of what empirical studies tell us about the impact of income on happiness; it also identifies a new type of overeducation.

Keywords: growth; overeducation; tax competition; income distribution; international social welfare function (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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