Coarse correlated equilibria in an abatement game

Herve Moulin, Indrajit Ray () and Sonali Sen Gupta

No 68684722, Working Papers from Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department

Abstract: We consider the well-analyzed abatement game (Barrett 1994) and prove that correlation among the players (nations) can strictly improve upon the Nash equilibrium payoffs. As these games are potential games, correlated equilibrium — CE — (Aumann 1974, 1987) cannot improve upon Nash; however we prove that coarse correlated equilibria — CCE — (Moulin and Vial 1978) may do so. We compute the largest feasible total utility and hence the efficiency gain in any CCE in those games: it is achieved by a lottery over only two pure strategy profiles.

Keywords: Abatement game; Coarse correlated equilibrium; Efficiency gain (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 Q52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-mic
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Related works:
Working Paper: Coarse Correlated Equilibria in an Abatement Game (2014)
Working Paper: Coarse Correlated Equilibria in an Abatement Game (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lan:wpaper:68684722

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