Turnout and polarization under alternative electoral systems

Konstantinos Matakos, Orestis Troumpounis () and Dimitrios Xefteris

No 77401404, Working Papers from Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department

Abstract: We present a formal model of electoral competition where parties' platforms are endogenously chosen and depend on the degree of the electoral rule disproportionality. We first show that proportional electoral systems generate centrifugal forces that increase candidate differentiation. This in turn implies that more proportional systems are associated with lower levels of abstention from indifference. This two step theoretical prediction of the effect of electoral systems on turnout is then empirically validated even when we jointly control for the prevailing pivotality and party-system size hypotheses. Thus, our work highlights an additional link in the proportionality-turnout nexus.

JEL-codes: C23 C26 D02 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Related works:
Chapter: Turnout and Polarization Under Alternative Electoral Systems (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lan:wpaper:77401404

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