Linking individual and collective contests through noise level and sharing rules

Pau Balart, Subhasish Chowdhury and Orestis Troumpounis ()

No 98653895, Working Papers from Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department

Abstract: We provide a theoretical link between the two most prominent ways of modeling individual and collective contests as proposed by Tullock (1980) and Nitzan (1991) respectively. By introducing Nitzan's sharing rule as a way of modeling individual contests we obtain a contest success function nesting a standard Tullock contest and a fair lottery. We first provide an equivalence result between the proposed contest and Tulllock's contest for the two-player set-up. We then employ this nested contest as a way of introducing noise in multi-player contests when in the Tullock contest a closed form solution for the equilibrium in pure strategies does not exist. We conclude by comparing the proposed contest with the existing ones in the literature.

Keywords: Individual contest; Collective contest; Equivalence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Linking individual and collective contests through noise level and sharing rules (2017)
Working Paper: Linking individual and collective contests through noise level and sharing rules (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lan:wpaper:98653895

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