Majority voting with stochastic preferences: The whims of a committee are smaller than the whims of its members

Pierre-Guillaume Méon

Working Papers of LaRGE Research Center from Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie (LaRGE), Université de Strasbourg

Abstract: We study the volatility of the policy chosen by a committee whose members have volatile preferences. It is smaller than if it was chosen by a single member, smaller the larger the size of the committee, and smaller the volatility of members' preferences.

Keywords: Committee; majority voting; uncertainty; volatility. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Related works:
Journal Article: Majority voting with stochastic preferences: The whims of a committee are smaller than the whims of its members (2006)
Working Paper: Majority voting with stochastic preferences: the whims of a committee are smaller than the whims of its members (2006)
Working Paper: Majority voting with stochastic preferences: the whims of a committee are smaller than the whims of its members (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lar:wpaper:2004-07

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