Is Corruption an Efficient Grease ?
Pierre-Guillaume Méon () and
Laurent Weill ()
Working Papers of LaRGE Research Center from Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie (LaRGE), Université de Strasbourg
This paper tests whether corruption can be viewed as an efficient grease in the wheels of an otherwise deficient institutional framework. It does so by analyzing the interaction between aggregate efficiency, corruption, and other dimensions of governance for a panel of 54 countries both developed and developing. Using three measures of corruption and five measures of other aspects of governance, we repeatedly observe that corruption is always detrimental in countries where institutions are effective, but that it may be positively associated with efficiency in countries where institutions are ineffective. We thus find evidence of the grease the wheels hypothesis.
Keywords: Governance; corruption; income; aggregate productivity; efficiency. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C33 K4 O43 O47 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law, nep-pol and nep-reg
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Journal Article: Is Corruption an Efficient Grease? (2010)
Working Paper: Is corruption an efficient grease? (2010)
Working Paper: Is corruption an efficient grease? (2008)
Working Paper: Is corruption an efficient grease?
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lar:wpaper:2008-06
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