Debt renegotiation and the design of financial contracts
Christophe Godlewski
Working Papers of LaRGE Research Center from Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie (LaRGE), Université de Strasbourg
Abstract:
I study the impact of bank loan renegotiation on the design of financial contracts. Debt renegotiation can be beneficial for borrowers and lenders but its impact on the design of financial contracts is less clear. However, contract design is crucial for borrower’s investment, operating and financing policies. I find that the design of renegotiated credit agreements is not homogenous. Main renegotiation packages contain amendments to loan amount and maturity. I show that secured loans with longer maturities experience broader amendments. Creditors’ friendly environment and the presence of reputable, sound, and profitable lenders have a similar effect.
Keywords: financial contracts design; bank loans; debt renegotiation. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G10 G21 G24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-cfn and nep-cta
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
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Related works:
Journal Article: Debt Renegotiation and the Design of Financial Contracts (2019) 
Working Paper: Debt Renegotiation and the Design of Financial Contracts (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lar:wpaper:2016-03
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