Collusion, Managerial incentives and antitrust fines

Florence Thepot () and Jacques Thépot
Additional contact information
Florence Thepot: School of Law, University of Glasgow

Working Papers of LaRGE Research Center from Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie (LaRGE), Université de Strasbourg

Abstract: Based on a duopoly price competition model, this paper argues that collusion on managerial incentive compensations may have the equivalent effects to collusion on prices. This paper also provides an analysis of the effect of different antitrust fines regimes in the context of a game between two companies each composed of two-level of decision making (the board of directors and the sales manager). The contribution of this paper is two-fold: it identifies" backstage arrangements" that may be used by companies in order to achieve monopoly pricing outcome without entering into explicit price-fixing practices. It also highlights the inefficiency of fining regimes based on sales when companies have a multi-layer decision-making structure

Keywords: duopoly; antitrust law; governance. JEL classification : K21; L13; L41. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ind, nep-law and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://ifs.u-strasbg.fr/large/publications/2017/2017-06.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lar:wpaper:2017-06

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers of LaRGE Research Center from Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie (LaRGE), Université de Strasbourg Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Christophe J. Godlewski ().