QUEL SYSTEME INCITATIF REALISTE POUR LA POLITIQUE DE REDUCTION DES DECHETS MENAGERS ? ENSEIGNEMENTS TIRES DE LA LITTERATURE ECONOMIQUE ET DU CAS FRANÇAIS / WHAT WORKABLE INCENTIVE SCHEME FOR THE REDUCING KERBSIDE WASTE POLICY? LESSONS DRAWN FROM THE ECONOMIC LITERATURE AND FRENCH CITIES EXPERIENCE
Damien Broussolle ()
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Damien Broussolle: LaRGE Research Center, Université de Strasbourg
Working Papers of LaRGE Research Center from Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie (LaRGE), Université de Strasbourg
Reducing the volume of kerbside waste has become a vital goal for many cities in the world. Since the pricing of communal waste services is often inefficient, economic literature promotes an incentive scheme, which most frequently consist in a unit pricing, “pay as you throw” system. Based on empirical studies, advanced economic works and the French experience, the paper explains why this approach is fairly limited. Unit pricing faces practical difficulties and does not fit to collective housing. Whether households’ motivation is utilitarian or value oriented, the analysis of their behaviour shows that, a too large extension of the inducement part of the price, might bring about significant inconveniences. Finally, a small incentive part is to be favoured. It may seem unsatisfactory and contradictory to the very principle of incentive pricing, but the paper underlines it is not so. Nevertheless, an incentive scheme for households must also use other inducing mechanisms. The deposit refund system is the prominent one; it basically aims at the same goals as unit pricing, but avoids its troubles. NOTICE: the paper is in French
JEL-codes: Q52 D62 R28 D91 H31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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